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Municipal Bond Credit Outlook for 2012

By Richard Larkin
Published February 8, 2012
“If you can keep your head when all about you are losing their…”

 - Rudyard Kipling

In late 2010, the tax-exempt municipal bond market was rocked by a prediction of “hundreds of billions of dollars” of municipal bond defaults in 2011. How did that prediction fare, now that 2011 is over?

Yields rose to their highest levels in 18 months, prices on outstanding debt dropped, and withdrawals from municipal bond funds accelerated, in part because of the fear fostered by this bombastic report. Informed investors recognized that this fear was overblown, and the default projections were baseless. While many panicked, those that understood municipal credit risk profited by being able to buy municipals at bargain prices offered by fearful investors. Yields began to stabilize as early as February 2011, as more knowledgeable analysts and investors debunked the absurd prediction. A year later, prices on those same bonds have risen dramatically, and yields on general obligation bonds reached record low levels not seen since the 1960’s.  The record low yields of today have prompted some to wistfully recall the opportunities of early 2011.

Despite predictions of wide-scale defaults on municipal bonds, the tally for 2011 remained below $6 billion out of an estimated $3.5 trillion market ; that includes about $3 billion of municipal bond defaults related to the bankruptcy of American Airlines on industrial revenue bonds.  Defaults on traditional government-backed municipal bonds were less than $1 billion, with the other $2 billion attributed to traditional high risk sectors. That does not mean the municipal bond market is out of the woods just yet; the current economic slowdown does not seem to be improving anytime soon. The fact that most defaults were the result of private company insolvencies is not a surprise to informed followers of the tax-exempt market.

In a report published by HJ Sims in January 2011, I predicted that tax-exempt bond defaults in 2011 would not exceed $20 billion. I also believe that the low default rate of $6 billion in 2011 (compared to $8.5 billion in 2008 and $7.3 billion in 2009) is still understated, and that there could be an increase from this relatively low level over the next 12 months. Even if total municipal bond defaults are as high as $20 billion for 2012, this would still be less than 1% of the $3.5 trillion of outstanding municipal debt, and a far cry from the “hundreds of billions of defaults” envisioned by doomsday analyst Meredith Whitney in her now-famous appearance on the “60 Minutes” news show in December 2010.

Where are the Potential “Hot Spots” for Municipal Credit Risk in 2012?

Municipal credit risk will continue to be concentrated in the high-yield sectors of corporate industrial revenue bonds, development district (sometimes called utility district) bonds, the housing bond sector, and the healthcare/nursing home sector. I still believe that total tax-exempt defaults will not exceed $20 billion this year.

The foundation for my forecast comes from a study of municipal bond defaults that occurred between 1979 & 1986, a period of the highest measured credit risk since the Great Depression, performed by Fitch Ratings in 1999. The period of 1979-1986 was marked by some extraordinary economic circumstances that, while different from the root causes of the current recession, still represent one of the most difficult economic periods in post-World War II history, as shown by these events:

  • The period was marked by not one, but two recessions between 1979-1982 (6 months in early 1980, and 1 year four months from mid-1981 through late 1982);
  • A major energy crisis in 1979 after the Iranian Revolution, which drove up energy costs dramatically for the second time after the original 1973 Energy Crisis;
  • A period marked by high-double digit inflation rates, as well as record-high interest rates in the early 1980’s (when the prime interest rate rose as high as 20.0%, resulting in the highest municipal borrowing costs in history);
  • Mushrooming tax-exempt debt by conduit bond issuers trying to take advantage of expiring tax-exempt regulations in 1986’s Tax reform Act; and
  • The largest single municipal revenue bond default, totaling billions of dollars, by the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) in 1982.

The most interesting feature of Fitch’s 1999 Default Study was that it included all tax-exempt bond issuance, not just those that were rated by the major rating agencies. It also delineated defaults by type of issuance and purpose so that conclusions could be reached on defaults by sector, rather than a one-size-fits-all default rate. This feature of the tax-exempt bond market is well-known by municipal bond professionals, which explains why there is a high-yield sector for municipal bond trading that differs greatly from the majority of tax-exempt debt that is issued by city, state and local governments across the United States.

The bulk of municipal bond issuance is for General Purpose, Education, Water and Sewer Utility service, Transportation, Public Facilities, Environmental Projects, and municipal Electric Power, mostly represented by state, city and school district agencies that enjoy taxing power, and/or virtually monopoly control on tax/revenue raising, rate setting and expenditure levels. These sectors had among the lowest average annual rates of default during this period. These sectors (which I call the Governmental and Utility Sectors) also issued 83% of all debt issued ($2.9 trillion out of $3.5 trillion) as measured over the last ten years by the Daily Bond Buyer, the municipal bond newspaper which tracks tax-exempt bond issuance and municipal credit news.

The high-yield sectors include Development bonds, which are made up by industrial revenue bonds that are backed only by corporation guarantees, and development district bonds commonly known as “dirt” bonds. The housing sector and healthcare/nursing home sectors are traditionally also viewed as high yield sectors. These three areas, which only account for about 17% of all debt issued in the last 10 years, could account for 85% of projected defaults in 2012.  The yields in these sectors are attractive in the current environment of record low interest rates, if the investor is selective. While we offer full-spectrum investing, HJ Sims specializes in fixed income bonds, including high yield, non-investment grade tax-free issues that have been uniquely crafted or reviewed by our experts in the senior living, health care and education sectors. Through the years, we’ve compiled an impressive track record:

  • Since 1965, we’ve issued over $7.5 billion in high yield, non-investment grade bonds
  • Of these, over $3.8 billion have already reached maturity, been repaid or closed
  • The composite return on these issues translates to an average modified yield of 9.66%.

In order to arrive at $20 billion dollars of municipal bond defaults for the next 12 months, using the 1979-1986 period as a guide, you would need to increase those annual average worst-period default rates during that period to nearly SIX TIMES that average:

  • Development bonds could default at a one-year rate of about 10%, for an estimated total of $7 billion dollars of defaults out of about $72 billion outstanding;
  • HealthCare (Hospital and Senior Living bonds) could default at about a 2% rate, or $7 billion out of an estimated $351 billion outstanding;
  • Housing bonds are estimated to default at about a 1 ½% rate, or about $3 billion of an estimated $200 billion outstanding; and
  • Governmental and Utility sector bonds might total $3.0 billion of defaults in 2012, or a one-year default rate of 0.1% (a little more than one tenth of a percent of the $3.5 trillion of debt issued in these sectors over the last 10 years).
  • Finally, $20 billion of total defaults (which is my worst case estimate) pales in comparison to $3.5 trillion of outstanding bonds, and would still amount to less than 1% of all outstanding municipal debt.

For more detail and analysis, please email Dick Larkin for the full Sims report, “Municipal Bond Credit Outlook: The ‘Real Dope’ on Where Defaults can be Anticipated in 2012”.

The material presented here is for information purposes only and is not to be considered an offer to buy or sell any security. This report was prepared from sources believed to be reliable but it is not guaranteed as to accuracy and it is not a complete summary of statement of all available data. Information and opinions are current up to the date of publication and are subject to change without notice. The purchase and sale of securities should be conducted on an individual basis considering the risk tolerance and investment objective of each investor and with the advice and counsel of a professional advisor.